ou(1)
有一點香港的基金經理是永遠不會重視的,2008年9月,胡錦濤總書記視察了中國龍工在河南廠房。
這對中國龍工來說,幾乎是天大的好消息,比什麽業務前景都重要,但恐怕外界的基金經理根本不能理解其中的含義。
如果看過“激蕩三十年”,就會知道,中共打壓出頭的民企是必然的規律,尤其是處於上游行業的,和壟斷國企造成競爭的。
最新的例子是武漢的東星航空,老闆在談判的最後關頭拒絕被國航收購,下場就是馬上被抓起來關進大牢,被申請破産。武漢政府覺得,武漢應該發展成爲華中樞紐,只能讓國航來發展,東星不聽話,是不能客氣的,不是一個經濟問題,是政治問題。
中國龍工其實非常危險。它的業績非常好,但它處於的行業,裝備製造業是有很多國企的。地方政府、國資委肯定是千方百計要弄倒它的,要把董事長抓起來,企業申請破産,再造華晨的翻版。胡錦濤總書記去視察,是非同小可的舉動,起碼地方政府要搞它,要更加小心,不敢那麽輕舉妄動了。
在過往三十年,出事的龍頭民企,沒有一家是享受過總書記視察的待遇的。僅此一點,中國龍工的前景就無可限量。
要知道,決定民企發展的,是政治,而不是經濟;如果政治搞不好,就算再賺錢也可以一天就倒下來,如果政治搞好了,就算經營不好,長期而言,也肯定是贏家,因爲它的那些只懂算經濟帳的競爭對手遲早是要被收拾的。
(2)
有一些事是要說明白的。
中國是一直打壓民企,壓制私營經濟的。過去如此、現在如此、將來也是如此。你可說它是好或是不好,可以有自己的理解和含義,但這不能改變這個中國經濟發展的基本事實。
1957年,全國私營工商企業公私合營。全國80萬的大中小資本家,資本收歸國有,國家按資本額每年發百分之五的定息。一直發到1966年,共發了十年,其後就停發了,原因衆所周知。
1979年,商務部下發紅頭文件,明確停止發放利息。也就是說,在1949年以前中國所有的私人資本,等於被國家強行以抵於五折的價錢收購了,實際上,攤開十年的折現率,這個比例更低。
這個文件是在改革開放,文革結束以後頒發的,也等於是現行的國策。
一切都是政治。80萬的資本家,文革期間爲了這一點的資本和定息飽受衝擊,文革後,不單沒有補償和補發利息,迎來反而是一紙正式剝奪財産權利的文件。
相比之下,文革期間受衝擊的幹部,後來都補發了工資,提高了政治待遇。說的是十年以上的工資,一次性補發。
更相比之下,真正的大資本家,解放前攻擊最烈的“四大家族”,因爲都在海外,反而飽受禮遇。宋子文家族在中國銀行的股份一直沒有受到影響。
中囯共產黨不知道現代的産權概念嗎?當然知道,而且非常清楚。如果它把宋子文的股份也沒收了,那中國銀行在2000年也就不可能在海外上市了。這甚至是毛澤東時代就定下的策略。
紅頭文件嚴格來說,是沒有法律效力的;這樣以紅頭文件的形式來沒收私人財産的方式,從過去到現在到將來,一直是中國私人資本的最大風險。
如果按照嚴格的法律意義,1979年的紅頭文件應該予以糾正,這也是當年“物權法”數易其稿的原因之一。
如果嚴格糾正,在中國和海外更加會引起天文數字的訴訟。單說海外,例如同仁堂這樣公私合營企業,其後又國有股改制,之後又海外上市的企業,整個産權結構都是說不清楚的。
只有榮氏家族在整個浪潮中是沒有受到大影響的。1979年,鄧小平送一億元給榮毅仁開辦中信公司,背後不是沒有道理的;從此以後,中央多次解救榮氏家族,也不是沒有道理的。都是在換政治的債,把欠八十萬人的債,還到一個人身上,因爲他肯聽話。
所以,榮智健一鋪輸清的,不但是他自己的錢,更是背後八十萬人的錢,和命、血、淚;令人痛心。
歷史將周而復始上演,完成一個又一個的迴圈。
4 条评论:
另一篇有關 "東星" 的評論。這篇解答了,為何央企如 "國航" 也不能直接往武漢建立地盤,寧用間接方式,收購 "東星" ? "國航" 擴充勢力要面對甚麼門檻 ?
南華早報 | 2009-04-04
BIZ10| BIZ| Money Matters| By Shirley Yam
Too many twists to ignore in detention of airline boss
Like most of you, I had never heard of Lan Shili until recently. The owner of China's fourth private airline, East Star Airlines, made headlines two weeks ago when mainland police detained him.
Police put people in custody every day. However, there were too many twists to ignore in Mr Lan's case.
He was arrested less than 48 hours after he publicly denounced an acquisition proposal from China National Aviation Holding (CNA), the parent of mainland flag carrier Air China, as barbaric.
Potential debt evasion was the official reason given for his arrest.
The day after his denunciation, the authorities grounded all the flights of his airline on the grounds that a financially stressed company and an emotionally disturbed crew might pose safety hazards.
The media questioned the legitimacy of the grounding and arrest. Some even allege it was a coercive move by the public sector to extinguish their private rivals. These open criticisms are quickly gagged but the chatter remains online.
Reading this saga and the allegations, I cannot help but wonder why.
One question people are asking is why would major carriers want to get hold of a struggling tiny rival, which will die a natural death anyway? What's the value of East Star?
A chat with domestic and international carrier executives gave me no straight answer but the complicated web of power in the country's aviation industry that involves the central and provincial governments as well as the army.
Let's start with the basics first. To operate an airline, you need four things - regulatory approval, air route designation, the aircraft and the crew.
One will imagine the big players in the industry would have little difficulty in getting any of these.
The aviation market of Wuhan, in Hubei province, where the whole saga is staged, however, shows this is not the case.
Given its central location, Wuhan is of strategic importance to any carrier. Three airlines operate there - China Southern, China Eastern and Mr Lan's locally groomed East Star. Their market share is 40 per cent, 20 per cent and 10 per cent, respectively.
Air China provides flights in Wuhan but runs no local operation and has a meagre market share of 5 per cent. Not that CNA does not want it, but there are hurdles.
First, the regulatory approval. Major state-owned airlines can easily get approval from the Civil Aviation Administration of China. Getting local officials to agree on your setting up of a subsidiary there and sharing the pie with their friends or home-groomed boys is a different game.
Obviously, CNA did not have the right connection at the local level before, said an industry source.
To its advantage, both the Hubei and Wuhan leadership underwent a major reshuffle in March last year. The door finally opened.
Last month, CNA signed an accord with the Hubei provincial government to set up a subsidiary in its capital Wuhan in return for making the city a regional hub.
If so, why would CNA need East Star? That brings us to the second hurdle, that is, the flight time and route approvals, which are controlled by the military. Time and route largely determine an airline's attractiveness and profitability.
Having some friends in the central and local governments does not guarantee one a smooth path within the military because the two systems are separate. Once again, you need the right friends.
We are talking about the bondage of sleeping in the same camp amid the bitter winter chill, said the source.
If CNA has to start from scratch, it can easily take years to win route approvals.
East Star, which operates about 20 routes from Wuhan, provides a good jump-start. In addition, it has eight A320 planes and crew, which are all based in Wuhan. In a country where the government remains inefficient and bureaucratic, the ready availability of the latter means huge savings.
Just imagine you have to uproot a few hundred people, including the crew and their families from Beijing or any place and move them to Wuhan. The time and costs are significant.
For those who doubt its difficulty, just look at an earlier fiasco at China Eastern. In March last year, 14 pilots of the airline took a U-turn, minutes before landing, in protest against the handling of the relocation of crews and their families.
No wonder CNA wants East Star dearly, although the latter has no less than 6 billion yuan (HK$6.8 billion) in debt.
With the financial tsunami came time to jump on its prey. While East Star is battered, CNA has 3 billion yuan of freshly injected government money, and perhaps more importantly, a CAAC head who is its former chairman and an open supporter of the establishment of one large and competitive flag carrier in the country.
CNA approached Mr Lan for a 100 per cent takeover and injected no less than 50 million yuan into East Star to ensure the latter's business kept running in order to preserve the routes and the crew. Had Mr Lan yielded to fate and took whatever CNA paid him, the deal would have been sealed late last month as CNA's chairman had openly predicted.
But Mr Lan did not. He knows the intangible value of his airline and asked for 300 million yuan, according to industry sources. Now, his whereabouts are unknown.
CNA confirmed it remained interested in East Star. No one knows if the negotiation is still going on. I just wonder when Mr Lan reappears, will he have a signed contract to sell in hand?
"中共打壓出頭的民企是必然的規律"
so why 胡錦濤視察了中國龍工在河南廠房?
不留名不回应。
我沒接觸太多中國經濟的歷史, 但我還知道鹽, 鐵, 鑄錢在漢代都是官營的,
或者說一涉及所謂"國家安全", 中國人的政府都愛官營, 不過共產黨因為共產主義, 會更有"共產"的意識吧.
現在的情況, 與其是打壓私營, 不如換句邱吉爾說過的一句廁所笑話:"你們見到大的東西, 都想收歸國有"
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